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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
27 August 2008
Statement by H.E. Andrew Goledzinowski Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of Australia to the United Nations on working Methods of the Security Council
(As delivered)
Thank you Mr President, and I’d like to thank you very much for convening this debate. At the outset, I would like to also thank Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland for the burden they have taken on in pushing this issue, as well to praise the efforts Japan undertook when it was last on the Council. While Security Council Reform in general has been stuck elsewhere, some modest achievements have been made in improving the Council’s working methods and we encourage more work in this regard.
Not having been on the Council for over 20 years, but as a contributor to many peacekeeping operations mandated by this body, and of course as a member state bound by its decisions, Australia, and indeed other member states, expect this body’s deliberations should be transparent, defensible and accountable.
It is all our soldiers and police who may be put in harm’s way as a result of Council decisions; it is our regulations that will have to be adjusted to comply with Council rulings. It is our taxpayers who will contribute to the execution of Council mandates. And of course the quality of Council decisions impact directly on those affected by conflict and insecurity – they are our ultimate constituents to whom we are all responsible.
So the basic mindset of the Council should be one of active accountability and deliberate transparency. We expect the Council to regard the need to justify its decisions, to share information, to consult widely and to accept input not as burdensome or optional extras, but as core elements of its working methods.
Let me offer a few brief thoughts on what this might mean in practice – more detail can be found in the printed copy of Australia’s intervention. These thoughts reflect the sort of direction Australia would want the Council to go, and may help structure our collective discussion.
First: State the Vision
We suggest the Council should commit itself to a realistic vision of active accountability and deliberate transparency. This may seem a bit trite, but let me speak frankly: the Council has a serious image problem. Outside of this building, in many capitals and in the wider public, it is regarded as cosseted, a closed club, doing good where it can, but regularly and jealously guarding privileges and specific interests. That image is not going to change overnight. Real change will require substantive reform, but reform of working methods can help.
A good start would be to state that the Council has an objective: that it aims to be, like any modern, effective organisation should, accountable and transparent. If the Council commits to nothing in its working methods, it can’t be held accountable for anything. And that is not good enough.
Second: Establish the Metrics
We believe progress can only reliably be made if you measure what you do.
If we want real reform, we need quantitative and qualitative measures. How much of the Council’s work is done behind closed doors? How much needs to be done behind closed doors? How soon are elected countries brought into deliberations? How often are result ions drafted ahead of open debates – and what, if any changes are made following those debates? What percentage of E10 or non-Council member drafting recommendations are accepted? What percentage of P5 drafting recommendations are accepted?
Third: Assess Progress
The Council should take these sorts of measures and issue them periodically – say every two years, so we know if we are making progress or not. Self-assessment can be useful and necessary. The Council should reflect more on this themselves. But equally an external assessor is not a bad idea. The work of one external organisation, the Security Council Report, led well by someone well known to many of us – and who participated in the last debate on this issue, back in 1994 – is illustrative of what can be done.
Fourth: Harness Technology
The Council should consider the creative use of information technology particularly for non-controversial matters. Major knowledge-intensive corporations have adopted collaborative models allowing for maximum input from a wide pool of expertise. Is there scope for such approaches, using web-based documents to pool expertise? We accept this sort of cultural change won’t happen overnight, but can we have a vision for where we could be in say 5, 10 or 15 years? If we don’t plan, if we don’t imagine a different way forward, we will be condemned to following methods and processes designed in the 1940s.
Let me be clear on all this: We are not calling for all Council meetings to be held in the open; nor do we need to know everything about your internal deliberations. But we do expect the Council not to be caught up in the practice of the past, following outmoded ways of behavior just because no one has thought – or can make the effort – to change it.
And there is no need to have an overarching process to institute immediate and sensible changes. For example, Panama’s change to enable non-members participating under rule 37 to speak first, ensures the Council is better informed of the views of those most directly involved in issues. South Africa’s leadership of the Core Group for Timor-Leste has enabled those with expertise but not currently serving on the Council to work directly with the Council on this key issue.
Australia welcomes these initiatives and encourages further practical measures to enhance the accountability and transparency of Council operations. We support Council use of email alerts to notify states of its meetings. We encourage greater use of briefings for non-members states, in particular through use of Core Group meetings and briefings for troop contributing states. And we welcome many of the ideas for improvement identified in the work of the so-called S5 group of states.
But we non-members should also reflect on our own performance. Too often we turn up at open debates and merely read out what our capitals have sent us, rather than respond to the interventions that have come before; ignoring time limits and not availing ourselves of the opportunity to shorten our interventions and distribute a longer, written text – as we have done today. And with that, I’ll finish now.